Breaking news · U.S.–Iran conflict · Treasury sanctions · Maritime trade · Financial transparency · DINA analysis

WASHINGTON — October 21, 2026, 5:06 p.m. ET: The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned a Panama- and Greece-based law firm, two shipping agents, five people and nine vessels Wednesday in a new action against networks it says helped conceal and transport Iranian oil, petrochemicals and steel.

The action also opened a less visible financial front. Treasury said the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network issued its first administrative subpoena under Section 5318(k) of the Bank Secrecy Act while investigating an unnamed Greek bank's possible ties to Iran and its proxies. Reuters reported that FinCEN also sought information from six other unnamed European banks about relationships with sanctioned Iranian financial institutions.

What is confirmed: Treasury published the designations, identified the legal authority used and described the sanctions consequences. FinCEN confirmed the subpoena and information requests. Those official acts are facts.

What remains alleged: Treasury's claims about shell companies, hidden beneficial ownership, cargoes, revenue and links to Iranian military entities are government allegations. A sanctions designation is an executive action, not a criminal conviction or civil judgment. Karnakis & Karnakis did not immediately respond to Reuters' request for comment.

The legal and corporate network Treasury describes

Treasury designated Karnakis and Karnakis under Executive Order 13902, saying the firm operated in Iran's petroleum and petrochemical sectors. The department alleges that the firm registered companies that owned or managed vessels used to move hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian commodities.

The release names the firm's owners, Sofianos Karnakis Kosmas and Konstantinos Karnakis Kosmas, and three employees: Ioanis Karnakis Kosmas, Pedro Ortega Jones and Roberto Ortega Jones. Treasury designated all five for allegedly acting for or on behalf of the firm. It says employees also served as directors or officers of registered companies in ways that obscured the companies' true beneficial owners.

Treasury further alleges that the firm helped build corporate structures for businesses connected to Iranian liquefied-petroleum-gas magnate Seyed Asadoollah Emamjomeh. The department also linked one previously designated company, Elias Shipping and Trading S.A., to the Al-Qatirji Company, which Treasury has accused of selling Iranian oil for the benefit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and the Houthis.

Nine vessels and two shipping agents

The action designated Roxette Maritime Shipping and Trading S.A., a Panama- and Greece-based company for which Treasury says Karnakis and Karnakis acts as corporate agent. Seven Panama-flagged cargo vessels connected to Roxette were identified as blocked property: ANEMOS, GLORIS, PRIDE, DESTINY, FLAMINGO 1, HARMONY and PRINCE.

Treasury says ANEMOS, GLORIS and PRIDE carried Iranian-origin petrochemicals or steel within the past year. It described the remaining four as vessels operated or managed by Roxette. DINA has not independently verified the cargo histories.

Treasury also designated Singapore-based Amigoz Singapore PTE. Ltd. and Dubai-based Whales Shipping Line LLC. The government alleges that Amigoz provided port and bunkering services to Iranian shadow-fleet actors and that Whales acted for a sanctioned front company purchasing Iranian petrochemicals. Two UAE-flagged support vessels registered to Whales—WHALES DIAMOND and WHALES PEARL—were identified as blocked property.

What the sanctions do

Property and interests in property belonging to designated people or entities that are in the United States, or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Entities owned 50 percent or more by one or more blocked people are generally blocked as well.

Unless an exemption or OFAC license applies, U.S. persons generally may not transact with blocked property or provide funds, goods or services to designated parties. Foreign financial institutions may face secondary-sanctions risk if they knowingly facilitate significant transactions for designated parties.

Treasury also notes that designated parties may petition for removal from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. The government says sanctions are intended to change behavior rather than punish, but designation can immediately restrict banking, insurance, port access and commercial relationships before any court reviews the underlying record.

Why the bank inquiry matters

Section 5318(k) allows Treasury or federal law-enforcement authorities to seek records from a foreign bank that maintains a correspondent account in the United States. Treasury characterized this as FinCEN's first administrative subpoena under that provision, making the procedural step at least as significant as the public sanctions list.

The government did not identify the Greek bank or the six other European banks from which Reuters says FinCEN requested information. That may protect an active investigation, but it also leaves depositors, counterparties and the public unable to assess the scope, timing or evidentiary basis of the inquiry.

DINA analysis

This section is independent analysis, not a government finding or court judgment. The strongest accountability issue is not the number of names added to a list; it is whether the government can demonstrate that the targeted corporate structures and bank relationships produced current, material sanctions evasion.

Targeting a law firm expands enforcement beyond ship owners and traders to the professionals who form companies and manage corporate records. That can close a genuine evasion channel, but it also raises due-process and legal-services questions. Treasury should distinguish evidence that professionals knowingly designed concealment from ordinary company-registration or representation work.

The unnamed-bank investigation creates a second test. If Treasury later alleges that European banks maintained prohibited relationships, it should disclose when U.S. authorities first detected the activity, what compliance warnings were issued, whether correspondent accounts were used, and what assets or transactions were actually interrupted. If the inquiry produces no enforcement action, Treasury should say so rather than leaving institutions under an indefinite cloud.

Wednesday's action also sits beside reports that the administration has considered easing restrictions on some sanctioned shadow-fleet vessels to reduce freight costs. The targets and policy tools may differ, but the public needs a coherent standard explaining when a vessel is blocked, when relief is available and how either decision advances stated U.S. objectives.

Strongest accountability questions

  • What unclassified corporate, shipping and payment records support each designation?
  • Why did FinCEN withhold the identities of the Greek bank and six other European banks, and what event would trigger public disclosure?
  • Did any U.S. correspondent account process the questioned transactions, and when were the U.S. institutions notified?
  • How much property or money was actually blocked at designation?
  • What evidence distinguishes knowing sanctions-evasion assistance from ordinary legal or corporate-service work?
  • What licenses or safeguards protect lawful humanitarian trade and other permitted transactions?
  • How will OFAC measure whether the action reduced Iranian revenue rather than shifting trade to replacement entities and vessels?

Urgent records and follow-up requests

  • Request OFAC's unclassified evidentiary memoranda, ownership charts, vessel histories and identifying data for every designated party.
  • Seek a redacted copy of the Section 5318(k) subpoena, its return deadline and any federal-court filing used to enforce it.
  • Request aggregate information on the six European-bank information demands, including dates, legal authority and response status.
  • Ask Treasury and the Federal Reserve whether any U.S. correspondent institution received supervisory findings or enforcement notices.
  • Track blocked-asset reports, rejected transactions, licenses, delisting petitions and court challenges.
  • Seek responses from Karnakis and Karnakis, Roxette, Amigoz, Whales and the five designated individuals and publish documented rebuttals or corrections.

Related DINA coverage

Sources

  1. U.S. Department of the Treasury — “Operation Economic Outcast Targets Iran's Shadow Fleet Networks,” October 21, 2026
  2. U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control — recent actions and designation data
  3. Reuters — U.S. sanctions Greece- and Panama-based law firm over alleged aid to Iranian shipping, October 21, 2026
  4. 31 U.S.C. § 5318 — Bank Secrecy Act special measures and foreign-bank record authority